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THE PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION IN SOCIETY: 
11 Ehninger's Paradigm and Religious Controversy•• 
James N. Holm, Jr. 
Douglas Ehninger, in 1970, presented his conception of 11 Argument 
As Method: Its Nature, Its L i mi ta ti ons And Its Uses. ul His con-
ception, as he duly noted, was 11 Paradigmatic rather than descriptive." 
His concern was with the defining "characteristics of argument ... 
with those abstract conditions or presuppositions upon which 'acts• 
of argument are predicated." 2 In short, Ehninger built a rational or 
formally logical model of argument which, insofar as possible, was 
uncorrupted by empirical or existential conditions. 
To any student of argument interested in both in theory and 
practice, however, one question concerning Ehninger's paradigm must 
inevitably arise: "To what degree does, or should, Ehninger's con-
ception represent reality?" 3 It is the purpose of this paper to attempt 
to answer that question by measuring Ehninger's paradigm against the 
practice or argumentation in a selected segment of society. In so 
doing, not only will Ehninger's theory be tested, though, but the 
structure and function of specific argumentative practices clarified. 
To measure the paradigm against the practice of argumentation in 
the courtroom, the campaign, labor negotiations or even the family 
would be, perhaps, to confound the issues rather than to clarify them. 
In each of these cases, the process or argumentation has been con-
taminated, altered from its natural course by factors extrinsic to the 
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process itself. Courtroom arguments are generally limited to propositions 
of fact and limited by traditional procedures as well. 4 Campaign argu-
ments deal primarily with policy and have been greatly affected by the 
media. 5 Labor negotiations are often constrained by contracts; and 
family controversies by the "game playing .. nature of people. 6 One 
must, therefore, select instances of argumentation which appear to have 
evolved as naturally as possible; for only if the practice is relatively 
free from contamination will it provide an adequate test of the paradigm. 
Several instances of such basically uncontaminated argumentation 
have occurred during key moments in the historical development of the 
Christian church. One such moment was the point at which the church 
became aligned with the Roman state during the reign of Constantine. 
The Reformation provided a second, extended period of religious con-
troversy. A final period emerged in America during the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Insofar as can be determined, none of these 
periods were regulated by any preconceived notions of proper argu-
mentative behavior; thus, they provide good test cases for Ehninger's 
theory. 
In the following paragraphs, then, key points of Enginger's 
paradigm will be outlined briefly and, subsequently, tested against 
the practice of religious controversy. 
Ehninger constructs his paradigm on the premise that A argues 
with B 11 not to add to B's repertory of facts or data, but to reshape 
a be 1 i ef or a 1 ter an attitude which B a 1 ready entertains. ,J Two 
critical aspects of this premise need to be noted: first, that 
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Ehninger appears to believe that argument is two-sided, with A and B 
trying to convince each other; second, that argument is not informative 
nor instructive, but merely corrective. The historical evidence drawn 
from the practice of religious controversy does not support the first 
aspect of Ehninger•s premise, but tends to support the second. 
The religious controversies tended to be three-sided. In most 
cases, opponents recognized that they could not persuade each other 
but chose public debate anyway, in order to win the assent of an 
audience. During the reign of Constantine, for example, Arius debated 
the religious leaders of Alexandria, Antioch, Caesarea and Nicomedia 
not to persuade them of his beliefs, but ot persuade the people of 
those cities. His strategy was, in fact, so effective that Constantine 
was forced to call the Council of Nicaea to settle the issues raised 
by Arius. 8 Similarly, Martin Luther debated Eck, and Zwingli debated 
the anabaptists to strengthen their respective positions among the 
people rather than to change their opponents' minds. Only in the debate 
in which Luther and Zwingli confronted each other was there a case of 
two-sided argumentation. Of course, the unhappy and very unsuccessful 
results of that debate establish even more strongly the proposition that 
argument should be three-sided. 9 Alexander Campbell, in the introduction 
of his famous debate with Robert Owen, gives an excellent summation of 
this point. 
When we agreed to meet Mr. Owen in public debate, 
i~ was not with any expectation that he was to be 
convinced of the error of his system ... nor .. . 
that I was in the least to be shaken in my faith .. . 
But the public, the wavering, doubting, and unsettled 
public are those for whose benefit this discussion 
has ... been undertaken. They are not beyond the 
reach of conviction, correction, and reformation.lO 
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Campbell 1 s statement, even as it supports the conclusion that 
argument is three-sided, also illustrates the attitude that argumen-
tation is primarily corrective rather than instructive. In each of the 
instances of religious controversy cited above, the goals of the dis-
putants were to reform attitudes or beliefs thought to be already held 
by the members of the various audiences. In every case, the controversies 
rested on the interpretation of data generally accepted by both sides. 
The men battled over what the scriptures· meant rather than over the 
authority or truth of the scriptures. 
The practice of religious controversy, therefore, appears to support 
the contention that argumentation is more corrective than instructive. 
At the same time, however, the preponderance of evidence suggests that 
argumentation has been, and ought to be, three-sided; for head-to-head 
disputes seem to have been significantly less effective in reforming . 
beliefs than those encounters in which the decision-making powers re-
sided in a third party. 
II 
Following the exposition of the premise on which he based his 
paradigm, Ehninger begins to develop his conception of the nature of 
argumentation. By comparing it with other modes of correction or 
decision-making, he arrives at the conclusion that argumentation is 
fundamentally antithetical to coercion, that its purpose is more to 
expose choices for the participants than to eliminate choice. From 
this essential nature, then Ehninger derives several attributes. 
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Argumentation is 11 bilateral and non-enforceable, permits of various 
levels and kinds of success, demands a posture of restrained partisan-
ship, and places the •person• in a position of genuine existential 
1 • k I II ll r1s . This entire conception is at odds with the evidence 
provided by the chosen historical cases. 
The essential nature of religious controversies seems to have 
come not from the fact that the participant~ were opposed to coercion 
but from the fact that they chose to interact symbolically rather 
than directly. First of all, it appears clear that many of the 
religious combatants did attempt to coerce their opponents. Excom-
munication, threats of damnation, loss of ~itizenship, and book-burning 
all characterized Luther•s struggle with the Roman Catholic Church. 12 
Similar attitudes existed among church controversialists on the American 
frontier. In the words of Methodist William Burke, 11 the Baptists did 
all they could to draw off our members and get them into the water. 1113 
In short, the motives of the religious disputants appeared quite coercive 
and, hence, could not have provided the essentially non-coercive nature 
which Ehninger attributes to argumentation. 
The fundamental ingredient, however, which was shared by most of 
the religious controversialists was the choice of interacting indirectly 
or symbolically rather than directly upon one another. The Catholic 
Church could have silenced Luther a great deal more quickly and completely 
than it chose to do. The tragic history of the Mormons in America, the 
deaths and tar-and-featherings, indicates that churchmen actually did take 
direct action upon occasion in order to silence opposing points of 
view. 14 Yet in the vast majority of cases, religious disputants advanced 
or defended their cases symbolically. 
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In choosing symbolic interaction as the primary mode of problem-
solving, it is probable that the religious leaders were moved at least 
as much by the political and social setting of the arguments as they 
were by any desire to avoid direct coercion. When Constantine became 
the Emperor of Rome, for example, the majority of his people were well 
aware of his sympathy for Christians and of the apparent power of that 
faith in battle. Thus, to have ended the issue of Arianism militarily 
was out of the question. 15 Luther and Zwingli, as well, were protected 
by the strongly favorable and quite nationalistic attitudes of the 
people of their respective locales. 16 In neither case could the 
Catholic churchmen have physically silenced their opponents without 
simultaneously causing a rebellion or revolution. Thus it would appear 
that the essential nature of religious arguments was rooted in the setting 
from which the controversy emerged and not in the desires of the dis-
putants to remain non-coercive. 
Because the nature of the religious argumentation was rooted in 
its setting, many of the attributes ascribed to it by Ehninger•s theory 
in fact did not exist. Specifically, while the historical controversies 
were bilateral and not self-enforcing, they did not permit of various 
levele or kinds of success, did not require a posture of restrained 
partisanship~ and often did not place the participants in positions of 
existential risk. First, victory or defeat was the typical conclusion 
of church combat, with the decision being made either by a town council 
as in the case of the Zwingli debates, or by the people as in Arius•s 
first four debates and in most of the American controversies. Second, 
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the actions of many of the participants, notably Luther and Eck, were 
anything but those of a restrained partisan. 17 Finally, it did not 
appear that most of participants were placed in any position of existen-
tial risk precisely because the results of many of the controversies 
were not enforceable. When Arius lost a debate, he simply moved to 
another city and began again. Certainly, the fact that Robert Owen 
lost his debate to Alexandef Campbe11 by a vote of nearly 1200 to 3 
did not in the least convince him that he was wrong nor deter him from 
subsequently promoting his utopian schem~m. 18 
In examining religious controversy, therefore, one is moved by the 
evidence to conclude that Ehninger's paradigm does not offer an accurate 
description of the nature of argumentation. Arguments, it seems, arise 
not from any motivation to avoid coercion but from the recognition that 
the setting for the confrontation requires symbolic interaction rather 
than the application of direct force. Furthermore, because it is 
essentially symbolic, the disputants can avoid most existential risk. 
In short, the nature of religious controversy tends to be in direct 
opposition to most of the points derived from Ehninger's paradigm. 
I I I 
Turning from his discussion of the nature of argumentation, 
Ehninger focuses, in turn, upon its limitations and its uses. In 
regard to its limitations, he suggests that argumentati_on is in-
decisive, restricted to a single pair of mutually exclusive alterna-
tives, applicable only to topics which can be treated symbolically, 
and capable of dealing solely with issues of means, and not those 
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of ends. 18 The test of these limits by historical evidence, however, 
appears to establish that Ehninger's list is partially incorrect and 
incomplete. 
On the one hand, the last three limitations he posed are sub-
stantiated by the evidence. Almost all of the religious argumentation, 
for example, did resolve itself into one set of mutually exclusive 
_alternatives. Interestingly, these alternatives were usually symboliz-
ed in terms of the men who advocated them. The popular choices, then, 
were those of Luther or Eck, Luther or Zwingli, and Campbell or Owen, 
rather than of the acceptance or rejection of the doctrines of tran-
substantiation, adult immersion, or the coming millennium. 
On the other hand, Ehninger's proposed limitation of indecisiveness 
was not supported by historical fact. As has been previously noted, 
in most of the religious controversies the decision-making power lay 
not with the disputants but with a third party. In these cases, there 
was a strong element of decisiveness at the conclusion of the arguments; 
for even though the arguers themselves might not have achieved a 
resolution of the issues, the judge usually had. Thus, Arius was banished 
from his country and the antibaptists ordered to stop the practice of 
adult immersion in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, to the degree that the setting of a controversy does 
indeed determine whether it will be settled symbolically or coercively, 
as history suggests, then argumentation has a limit which Ehninger fails 
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to point out. If it is true that the nature of controversy is a product 
of its setting, argumentation therefore is also limited by its setting. 
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It is limited to those settings in _which there is a third party with 
interest both in the issues involved and in its own well-being 
sufficient to promote symbolic interaction and to prevent direct 
coercion. From this analysis and discussion of the historical evidence, 
thus, it can be seen that Ehninger•s list of limitations is both in-
correct and incomplete. 
Finally, in regard to the uses of argument, Ehninger proposes 
that it may be, and ought to be, used in the resolution of problems 
because it is both more reliable and more humane than other methods 
of decision-making. He concludes: 
The ultimate justification of argument as method, 
therefore lies ... in the fact that by introduc-
ing the arguer 11 into a situation of risk in which 
openmindedness and toleration are possible, .. it 
paves the way toward 11 personhood 11 for the disputants, 
and through them and millions like them opens the 
way to a society in which the values and com- · 
mitments requfsite to 11 personhood 11 may some day 
replace the exploitation and strife which now 
separate man from man and nation from nation. 19 
With this vision of a peaceful and humane societv one should have no 
quarrel. But to suggest that argumentation,~~' is the path by 
which one can attain that goal is to neglect the lessons of history. 
For it has been established, at least within the history of religious 
controversy, that argumentation has been successfully pursued only 
when the society in which the controversy is set, itself is willing 
to listen to reason, to be moved by logic and evidence, and to abstain 
from violence. Thus, it is the nature of society itself, and not the 
nature of argumentation, which provides the key to a peaceful and 
humane existence. In sum, while one can acknowledge the validity of 
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the use Ehninger posits for argumentation, one is nevertheless constrained 
by the weight of historical evidence from putting too much faith in the 
effectiveness of the method itself. 
IV 
In conclusion, from the practice of argumentation in religious 
controversies one can draw two tentative conclusions: first, that 
argumentation requires at least three participants -- the arguers and 
a third party to make the decision; and second, that argument derives 
its essential nature from the fact that it is symbolic rather than 
direct interaction. To the extent that these two conclusions are valid, 
one can begin to derive from them principles of argumentative behavior 
which will, indeed, make the practice of this method of ' decision-making 
reliable and humane. One cannot, however, place his faith for achiev-
ing a peaceful or happy existence solely in this method or process; for 
the lessons of history suggest that unless mankind is willing to listen 
to reason, argument can have little effect. 
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